By Michael Phillips | MDBayNews
As debate continues over Maryland’s recent ban on formal 287(g) immigration enforcement agreements, former 2022 Republican Lt. Governor candidate Gordana Schifanelli is pointing to the state constitution — not partisan politics — as the real center of the dispute.
In a detailed legal analysis shared this week, Schifanelli argues that Article IV, Section 44 of the Maryland Constitution makes clear that county sheriffs are independently elected constitutional officers, not subordinate agents of the governor.
That distinction, she says, matters.
What the Constitution Actually Says
Article IV, § 44 provides that each county and Baltimore City shall elect a sheriff who serves a four-year term and “exercise[s] such powers and perform[s] such duties as now are or may hereafter be fixed by law.”
Schifanelli highlights several key implications:
- Sheriffs are elected by voters — not appointed by the governor.
- Their duties are “fixed by law,” meaning by statute enacted by the General Assembly, not by executive order.
- The governor lacks direct command authority over sheriffs in their day-to-day operations.
- Sheriffs historically operate with independent constitutional status grounded in common law.
In other words, Maryland’s structure deliberately separates sheriffs from executive branch control.
That separation is central to the ongoing controversy over Senate Bill 245 / House Bill 444, which Governor Wes Moore signed earlier this year, banning formal 287(g) agreements statewide.
Legislative Authority vs. Executive Authority
Schifanelli’s argument does not claim the General Assembly lacks authority to legislate in this area. Rather, she contends that a governor cannot unilaterally prohibit cooperation between sheriffs and federal law enforcement through executive action alone.
That is why the 287(g) restriction had to move through the legislative process.
However, even that legislative action may face legal challenges. Several sheriffs — including those in Frederick and Harford counties — have publicly argued that the law infringes on their constitutional autonomy.
Whether those challenges ultimately succeed will likely be decided in court.
The Broader Federal Cooperation Question
Importantly, the law bans formal 287(g) agreements, but it does not eliminate all forms of cooperation with federal authorities.
Sheriffs can still:
- Honor judicial warrants
- Share information under federal law
- Participate in criminal investigations
- Cooperate in task forces where permitted
The distinction between formal immigration enforcement authority and broader criminal law cooperation is legally significant.
Schifanelli’s analysis emphasizes that federal supremacy principles remain intact unless explicitly restricted by statute — and even then, constitutional questions may arise.
A Structural, Not Partisan, Issue
This debate goes beyond immigration policy. It raises foundational questions about Maryland’s separation of powers.
Sheriffs occupy a unique constitutional space — elected locally, accountable to voters, historically rooted in common law authority.
For those concerned about executive overreach, Schifanelli’s position reinforces a core principle: structural limits matter, regardless of who occupies the governor’s office.
For Democrats who supported the legislation, the counterargument is that the General Assembly has broad authority to define sheriffs’ statutory duties and can set statewide standards for law enforcement cooperation.
Ultimately, this is likely to become a test case for how Maryland balances:
- Statewide uniform policy
- Local constitutional authority
- Separation of powers
- Federal-state cooperation
As litigation looms, one thing is clear: the debate over 287(g) in Maryland is no longer just about immigration — it is about constitutional structure.
MDBayNews will continue tracking developments as challenges move through the courts.